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The Social Action, Responsibility and Heroism Act 2015 (the "Act") 1 received Royal 
Assent on 12 February.2 
According to the Ministry of Justice, this should be welcome news for millions of people 
who volunteer,3 with sports volunteering comprising the single biggest sector of 
volunteering in the UK.4As highlighted by European 10,000m champion Jo Pavey, 
volunteers are “absolutely crucial”,5since “volunteers and coaches make sport 
happen”,6 research indicating that sports volunteering in England has an estimated 
economic value of around £2 billion a year.7 
THE LIABILITY RISKS OF VOLUNTEERING 
Perhaps alarmingly, however, evidence suggests that being worried about risk and 
liability is a significant reason for not volunteering.8 In particular, sports coaches appear 
increasingly concerned about the prospect of legal liability,9 with contemporary 
jurisprudence even asking why volunteers would be willing to become involved in sports 
coaching given the associated liability risks.10 Consequently, as with section 1 of 
the Compensation Act 2006,11 (more comment on which is below) the Act is intended to 
signify a strong message from the Government that persons will be safeguarded from 
unreasonable exposure to negligence liability or breach of statutory duty when acting for 
the benefit of society. 
Importantly, given the extensive benefits derived from involvement in a wide range of 
sporting activities, the scope of this statutory provision should extend to “Everyday 
Sporting Heroes”. But, in reality, will volunteers such as sports coaches and instructors 
be better protected from litigation risk with the implementation of the Act? 
THE REMIT OF THE 2015 ACT 
Lord Faulks summarised the core aim of the Act as: 
“to provide reassurance to people who act in socially beneficial ways, behave in a 
generally responsible manner, or act selflessly to protect someone in danger by ensuring 
that the courts recognise their actions and always take that context into account in the 
event that something goes wrong and they are sued.”12 
Although the Act’s title tells us that its focus extends beyond sport, as a socially 
desirable activity, oftentimes reliant on volunteering, there seems little doubt that sports-
related activities can fall within its remit. 
It is a short Act, comprising of just five sections. We will take each in turn: 
Section 1, When this act applies, states: 
"This Act applies when a court, in considering a claim that a person was negligent 
or in breach of statutory duty, is determining the steps that the person was required 
to take to meet a standard of care." 
The important point here is that the Act requires the courts, when considering any 
claim that a person was negligent or in breach of statutory duty, to take into 
account each of the following three provisions when determining the steps that the 
person was required to take to meet the relevant standard of care. 
Section 2, Social action, states: 
"The court must have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of 
statutory duty occurred when the person was acting for the benefit of society or any 
of its members." 
Section 3, Responsibility, states: 
"The court must have regard to whether the person, in carrying out the activity in the 
course of which the alleged negligence or breach of statutory duty occurred, 
demonstrated apredominantly responsible approach towards protecting the safety 
or other interests of others." 
This section, by requiring the court to have regard, when something goes wrong, to 
whether the person sued demonstrated a predominantly responsible approach towards 
protecting the safety or other interests of others, represents an actual change in the law. 
In making this change, Lord Faulks confirmed that the courts will be obliged to weigh in 
the balance whether a person had demonstrated a predominantly responsible approach 
when determining whether the defendant met the required standard of care. 
Significantly, the Minister of State for Justice continued, “[w]hile that does not rewrite the 
law in detail, it is a substantive change”.13 
Section 4, Heroism, states: 
"The court must have regard to whether the alleged negligence or breach of 
statutory duty occurred when the person was acting heroically by intervening in an 
emergency to assist an individual in danger and without regard to the person’s own 
safety or other interests."14 
In summary, the four sections confirm the Act’s core aim, delineated by Lord Faulks, as 
being intended to provide reassurance to people acting: (i) in socially beneficial ways; (ii) 
in a predominantly responsible manner; or (iii) acting selflessly to protect someone in 
danger, by ensuring that the courts recognise, and account for, both the actions and 
context of the alleged negligence.15 
WHAT EFFECT IS THE ACT LIKELY TO HAVE IN PRACTICE? 
Interestingly, section 1 of the Compensation Act 2006 (CA 2006) already stipulates: 
"A court considering a claim in negligence or breach of statutory duty may, in 
determining whether the defendant should have taken particular steps to meet a 
standard of care (whether by taking precautions against a risk or otherwise), have 
regard to whether a requirement to take those steps might— 
prevent a desirable activity from being undertaken at all, to a particular extent 
or in a particular way, or 
discourage persons from undertaking functions in connection with a desirable 
activity."16[emphasis added] 
The rather obvious conclusion is that the Act is remarkably similar in effect to section 1 
of the CA 2006, the only practical difference being that Courts must take into account 
the former, whereas they may take into account the latter. This point was debated 
extremely enthusiastically during the passage of the Bill through the House of Commons 
and House of Lords, where numerous comments were made to the effect that any 
change to the law will be extremely limited.17 Notably, Lord Pannick observed somewhat 
entertainingly that; 
“the Bill puts me in mind of what Basil Fawlty says of his wife Sybil in the celebrated 
television programme, ‘Fawlty Towers’. I hope that noble Lords will excuse this 
unparliamentary language. He said: ‘She should be a contestant on “Mastermind”. 
Special subject: the bleedin’ obvious’. The Bill is a statement of the legally obvious. I 
find it very difficult to believe that, if enacted, it is going to make any difference 
whatever to any case that becomes before the courts”.18 
Indeed, such is the extent of the overlap and duplication with section 1 of the CA 2006 
that Lord Lloyd of Berwick went so far as to regard the Bill as being “of no importance at 
all. It is useless”.19Although echoing this dissent, the Bill’s successful passage through 
the Lords was reflected in Lord Pannick’s acknowledgement that “[t]his is a Government 
Bill that has been through the House of Commons. Its contents are not objectionable; 
they are simply pointless. Such a Bill is not worthy of provoking a fundamental conflict 
between the two Houses of Parliament”.20 In short, there appeared considerable support 
in the House of Lords for the argument that the “Bill is a tiddler”, with “no particular harm 
and no particular good in passing it”.21 
WILL THE ACT BROADEN THE COURT’S PERSPECTIVE? 
On the Government’s view, it appears plain that, in seeking to ensure that the standard 
of care required of defendants in the particular circumstances under the Act is set at a 
sensible and reasonable level, requiring the courts to adopt a slightly broader view of the 
defendant’s conduct is deemed advantageous.22 
This may indeed be the case. Nonetheless, in practice, courts already do this.23 For 
instance, the well-established components of the law of negligence presently require the 
magnitude of risk to be balanced against the cost of preventative measures,24 and the 
social value of the activity,25 when establishing the standard of care incumbent on 
defendants. 
Further, interpretation by the courts of the somewhat ambiguous and opaque wording 
regarding “the benefit of society”; “predominantly responsible approach”; and “acting 
heroically”, may prove problematic,26 and could lead to a number of unintended 
consequences, including wasted court time and expense in clarifying the full scope and 
intended effect of the Act.27 
Nevertheless, the Act is drafted to promote socially beneficial activities,28 and the 
corresponding jurisprudence of section 1 of the CA 2006 has been engaged by the 
judiciary to confirm that many physical recreations, including rugby and cricket, have a 
recognised social value.29 For instance, when considering a negligence claim in the 
context of amateur rugby football, whereby the claimant had a bad accident whilst taking 
part in a U16 Colts pre-season training session with his local club, Longmore LJ 
reinforced that: 
“It is important that neither the game's professional organisation nor the law should 
lay down standards that are too difficult for ordinary coaches and match organisers 
to meet. Games of rugby are, after all, no more than games and, as such are 
obviously desirable activities within the meaning of section 1 of the Compensation 
Act 2006”.30 
Additionally, the challenges of an efficient and professionally run outdoor pursuits 
centre,31 and the training of school children for the Ten Tors Expedition32 on 
Dartmoor,33 have also been recognised as socially desirable activities under section 1 of 
the CA. 
By analogy, there seems little doubt that sections 2 and 3 of the Act will apply to the 
coaching of sport, with the Act’s provisions affording practitioners another statutory tool 
to call in assistance in support of their case. As such, the Act can be expressly pleaded 
in Particulars of Claim/Defence and relied on to further inform the court about the 
standard of care exercised in the case in question. 
Similarly, the Act seems intended to give reassurance to organisations acting for the 
benefit of society, and so extend to national governing bodies of sport (NGB). 
Importantly, although the drafting of this legislation appears peculiarly mindful of 
voluntary organisations,34 as is consistent with section 1 of the CA 2006, its application 
should not be confined to solely volunteers or voluntary organisations. 
For instance, following Watson v British Boxing Board of Control,35 should the safety 
protocols adopted by a NGB be alleged to be inadequate,36 a material consideration for 
the court might be whether or not the NGB had demonstrated a predominantly 
responsible approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others. In 
considering whether or not the health and safety protocols adopted by associations were 
sufficient in reasonably protecting others from personal injury (most typically 
athletes/players), the intention of section 3 of the Act in this context would seem to be 
geared towards reassuring organisations adopting a generally responsible approach to 
the safety of others during an activity that “the law is on their side”.37 
Nonetheless, there appeared to be a dearth of case law examples provided by sponsors 
of the Bill to illustrate how judicial consideration of whether a predominantly responsible 
approach towards protecting the safety or other interests of others by defendants may 
have affected the outcome of a specific case. This may be because of the highly fact 
sensitive nature of claims brought in negligence. 
However, perhaps one such case to consider, involving the instructing of sport, may 
have been Anderson v Lyotier.38 In Anderson v Lyotier, a ski instructor (M. Portejoie) 
was found liable in negligence for the catastrophic personal injury suffered by the 
claimant when he collided with a tree when skiing off piste. Generally, skiing may be 
regarded as a socially desirable activity,39thereby likely to engage section 1 of the CA 
2006,40 and now sections 2 and 3 of the Act. Even so, the court held that the particular 
slope in question was a “step too far”, being beyond the capability of the claimant (and 
other members of the adult group), thereby creating a foreseeable risk of serious 
injury.41 Significantly, for present purposes, Foskett J made it clear that he “did not find it 
particularly palatable to have to find M. Portejoie in breach of duty”, accepting that the 
defendant was a very experienced ski instructor and “a generally conscientious one who 
is concerned for the safety and well-being of his students”.42 This marks a striking 
resemblance to section 3 of the Act. Since the Government has stated that it would 
welcome if the court’s consideration of the Act’s provisions tipped the balance in favour 
of a defendant in a finely balanced case,43 it is perhaps conceivable (though essentially 
academic) that application of the Act might have prevented a finding of negligence 
liability in Anderson. 
Although at first glance Anderson appears to endorse the scope of the Act, it is 
contended that this more expansive inquiry of the wider context, by requiring courts to 
adopt a slightly broader view of the defendant’s conduct, is arguably already achievable 
by engagement of section 1.44 This assertion appears to concur with the general view of 
Lord Lloyd.45 
SHOULD THERE BE APPROPRIATE CIVIL LIABILITY IMMUNITY IN ENGLAND AND 
WALES? 
Although there remains considerable uncertainty regarding what type of conduct will 
satisfy the Act’s provisions,46 this author’s view is that it is somewhat disconcerting why 
no serious consideration or scrutiny was afforded to the possibility of appropriate civil 
liability immunity in this jurisdiction,47 as in the Republic of Ireland.48 Significantly, in 
recommending legal liability premised on a gross negligence standard for individual 
volunteers, the Law Reform Commission of Ireland considered that: 
“[T]he imposition of a gross negligence test succeeds in striking a balance between 
the policy of encouraging altruistic behaviour with the public’s right to seek redress. 
With regard to encouraging altruistic behaviour, the leniency of the gross negligence 
test may be understood as a reward for good behaviour. Furthermore, it militates 
against the deterrent effect that the fear of litigation may cause. The Commission is 
of the view that this is an appropriate approach regarding Good Samaritans and 
individual volunteers, whether formal or informal, taking into account the benefits 
that flow from their activities and the sacrifices that they have made, from their own 
pocket and time, in conferring them. The application of the ordinary negligence test, 
on the other hand, would be to impose too heavy a burden that would threaten the 
continuation of such benevolent activities”.49 
Curiously, the possibility of limiting negligence liability for volunteers in this jurisdiction 
was never fully discussed, signifying a missed opportunity for meaningful discussion and 
critical consideration of a potential substantive change to the law designed to better 
protect and reassure “Everyday Sporting Heroes”. In dismissing this, Lord Faulks stated, 
“I reaffirm that the Bill does not seek to confer immunity from civil liability on anyone 
whose actions fall within its scope”.50 
SUMMARY 
Generally, the laudable intentions underpinning passage of the Act appear to be 
succinctly articulated by Lord Faulks as follows: 
“This Bill will contribute to an increasing reassurance which I hope the public has 
and that volunteers have in approaching life, which inevitably has many risks. ... 
This debate has divided roughly—only roughly— between lawyers who are hostile 
to the Bill and nonlawyers who seem rather more, with exceptions, in favour of it. 
We, as lawyers, should reflect a little on the occasional disconnect that exists not 
only between politicians and the public but sometimes between lawyers and the 
public. Should Parliament be legislating in this fashion at all if it is simply sending a 
message? I entirely accept what my noble friend Lord Hurd said about the fact that 
one should be very cautious indeed before legislating simply to send a message. 
But, on the other hand, I suggest that it would be idle to pretend that part of what we 
do is not conveying an important message”.51 
Significantly, section 1 of the CA 2006 was also intended to send a strong message to 
encourage volunteering, and although perhaps well intentioned, on balance, the author 
contends that the Act ultimately appears unlikely – at least from a strict legal perspective 
– to better safeguard amateur or professional sports coaches and instructors from the 
emerging prospects of legal liability.52 
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